x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()
The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating GS base
(which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is enabled, any
subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g. native_gdt_invalidate()) begins
crashing the kernel in an endless loop.
To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a KCOV-instrumented
kernel:
$ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel
$ kexec -e
The real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump collection in
syzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel before fuzzing and then
calls makedumpfile after the panic. This workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC
and CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled simultaneously.
Adding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc())
is also undesirable as it would introduce an extra performance overhead.
Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too fragile,
so disable KCOV instrumentation for the entire machine_kexec_64.c and
physaddr.c. If coverage-guided fuzzing ever needs these components in the
future, other approaches should be considered.
The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not supported
there.
[ bp: Space out comment for better readability. ]
Fixes: 0d345996e4 ("x86/kernel: increase kcov coverage under arch/x86/kernel folder")
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260325154825.551191-1-nogikh@google.com
master
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7aaa8047ea
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@ -44,6 +44,20 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_orc.o := n
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_frame.o := n
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_guess.o := n
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# Disable KCOV to prevent crashes during kexec: load_segments() invalidates
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# the GS base, which KCOV relies on for per-CPU data.
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#
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# As KCOV and KEXEC compatibility should be preserved (e.g. syzkaller is
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# using it to collect crash dumps during kernel fuzzing), disabling
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# KCOV for KEXEC kernels is not an option. Selectively disabling KCOV
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# instrumentation for individual affected functions can be fragile, while
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# adding more checks to KCOV would slow it down.
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#
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# As a compromise solution, disable KCOV instrumentation for the whole
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# source code file. If its coverage is ever needed, other approaches
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# should be considered.
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_machine_kexec_64.o := n
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CFLAGS_head32.o := -fno-stack-protector
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CFLAGS_head64.o := -fno-stack-protector
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CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(src)/../include/asm/trace
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@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o := n
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o := n
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_pgprot.o := n
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# See the "Disable KCOV" comment in arch/x86/kernel/Makefile.
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_physaddr.o := n
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KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o := n
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KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o := n
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