Commit Graph

11 Commits (09cfd3c52ea76f43b3cb15e570aeddf633d65e80)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ingo Molnar 0ca77f8d33 Merge branch 'x86/apic' into x86/sev, to resolve conflict
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/include/asm/sev-internal.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-09-05 09:01:42 +02:00
Ard Biesheuvel c54604fb7f x86/sev: Use boot SVSM CA for all startup and init code
To avoid having to reason about whether or not to use the per-CPU SVSM calling
area when running startup and init code on the boot CPU, reuse the boot SVSM
calling area as the per-CPU area for the BSP.

Thus, remove the need to make the per-CPU variables and associated state in
sev_cfg accessible to the startup code once confined.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-33-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03 17:58:26 +02:00
Ard Biesheuvel 00d2556676 x86/sev: Pass SVSM calling area down to early page state change API
The early page state change API is mostly only used very early, when only the
boot time SVSM calling area is in use. However, this API is also called by the
kexec finishing code, which runs very late, and potentially from a different
CPU (which uses a different calling area).

To avoid pulling the per-CPU SVSM calling area pointers and related SEV state
into the startup code, refactor the page state change API so the SVSM calling
area virtual and physical addresses can be provided by the caller.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-32-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03 17:58:22 +02:00
Ard Biesheuvel a5f03880f0 x86/sev: Avoid global variable to store virtual address of SVSM area
The boottime SVSM calling area is used both by the startup code running from
a 1:1 mapping, and potentially later on running from the ordinary kernel
mapping.

This SVSM calling area is statically allocated, and so its physical address
doesn't change. However, its virtual address depends on the calling context
(1:1 mapping or kernel virtual mapping), and even though the variable that
holds the virtual address of this calling area gets updated from 1:1 address
to kernel address during the boot, it is hard to reason about why this is
guaranteed to be safe.

So instead, take the RIP-relative address of the boottime SVSM calling area
whenever its virtual address is required, and only use a global variable for
the physical address.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-30-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03 17:58:15 +02:00
Ard Biesheuvel 37dbd78f98 x86/sev: Move GHCB page based HV communication out of startup code
Both the decompressor and the core kernel implement an early #VC handler,
which only deals with CPUID instructions, and full featured one, which can
handle any #VC exception.

The former communicates with the hypervisor using the MSR based protocol,
whereas the latter uses a shared GHCB page, which is configured a bit later
during the boot, when the kernel runs from its ordinary virtual mapping,
rather than the 1:1 mapping that the startup code uses.

Accessing this shared GHCB page from the core kernel's startup code is
problematic, because it involves converting the GHCB address provided by the
caller to a physical address. In the startup code, virtual to physical address
translations are problematic, given that the virtual address might be a 1:1
mapped address, and such translations should therefore be avoided.

This means that exposing startup code dealing with the GHCB to callers that
execute from the ordinary kernel virtual mapping should be avoided too. So
move all GHCB page based communication out of the startup code, now that all
communication occurring before the kernel virtual mapping is up relies on the
MSR protocol only.

As an exception, add a flag representing the need to apply the coherency
fix in order to avoid exporting CPUID* helpers because of the code
running too early for the *cpu_has* infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828102202.1849035-29-ardb+git@google.com
2025-09-03 17:55:25 +02:00
Neeraj Upadhyay 2c6978ea1a x86/apic: Add support to send IPI for Secure AVIC
Secure AVIC hardware accelerates only Self-IPI, i.e. on WRMSR to APIC_SELF_IPI
and APIC_ICR (with destination shorthand equal to Self) registers, hardware
takes care of updating the APIC_IRR in the APIC backing page of the vCPU.

For other IPI types (cross-vCPU, broadcast IPIs), software needs to take care
of updating the APIC_IRR state of the target vCPUs and to ensure that the
target vCPUs notice the new pending interrupt.

Add new callbacks in the Secure AVIC driver for sending IPI requests.  These
callbacks update the IRR in the target guest vCPU's APIC backing page. To
ensure that the remote vCPU notices the new pending interrupt, reuse the GHCB
MSR handling code in vc_handle_msr() to issue APIC_ICR MSR-write GHCB protocol
event to the hypervisor.

For Secure AVIC guests, on APIC_ICR write MSR exits, the hypervisor notifies
the target vCPU by either sending an AVIC doorbell (if target vCPU is running)
or by waking up the non-running target vCPU.

Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250828110824.208851-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com
2025-09-01 12:45:18 +02:00
Ingo Molnar 1f82e8e1ca Merge branch 'x86/msr' into x86/core, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
	arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
	arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
	arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c

 Semantic conflict:
	arch/x86/include/asm/sev-internal.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2025-05-13 10:42:06 +02:00
Ard Biesheuvel ed4d95d033 x86/sev: Disentangle #VC handling code from startup code
Most of the SEV support code used to reside in a single C source file
that was included in two places: the core kernel, and the decompressor.

The code that is actually shared with the decompressor was moved into a
separate, shared source file under startup/, on the basis that the
decompressor also executes from the early 1:1 mapping of memory.

However, while the elaborate #VC handling and instruction decoding that
it involves is also performed by the decompressor, it does not actually
occur in the core kernel at early boot, and therefore, does not need to
be part of the confined early startup code.

So split off the #VC handling code and move it back into arch/x86/coco
where it came from, into another C source file that is included from
both the decompressor and the core kernel.

Code movement only - no functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504095230.2932860-31-ardb+git@google.com
2025-05-05 07:07:29 +02:00
Tom Lendacky 18ea89eae4 x86/sev: Share the sev_secrets_pa value again
This commits breaks SNP guests:

  234cf67fc3 ("x86/sev: Split off startup code from core code")

The SNP guest boots, but no longer has access to the VMPCK keys needed
to communicate with the ASP, which is used, for example, to obtain an
attestation report.

The secrets_pa value is defined as static in both startup.c and
core.c. It is set by a function in startup.c and so when used in
core.c its value will be 0.

Share it again and add the sev_ prefix to put it into the global
SEV symbols namespace.

[ mingo: Renamed to sev_secrets_pa ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cf878810-81ed-3017-52c6-ce6aa41b5f01@amd.com
2025-04-24 17:20:52 +02:00
Ard Biesheuvel 681e290133 x86/boot: Drop RIP_REL_REF() uses from early SEV code
Now that the early SEV code is built with -fPIC, RIP_REL_REF() has no
effect and can be dropped.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250418141253.2601348-13-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-22 09:12:01 +02:00
Ard Biesheuvel 221df25fdf x86/sev: Prepare for splitting off early SEV code
Prepare for splitting off parts of the SEV core.c source file into a
file that carries code that must tolerate being called from the early
1:1 mapping. This will allow special build-time handling of thise code,
to ensure that it gets generated in a way that is compatible with the
early execution context.

So create a de-facto internal SEV API and put the definitions into
sev-internal.h. No attempt is made to allow this header file to be
included in arbitrary other sources - this is explicitly not the intent.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410134117.3713574-20-ardb+git@google.com
2025-04-12 11:13:05 +02:00