Uninitialized pointers with `__free` attribute can cause undefined
behavior as the memory assigned randomly to the pointer is freed
automatically when the pointer goes out of scope.
crypto/asymmetric_keys doesn't have any bugs related to this as of now,
but, it is better to initialize and assign pointers with `__free`
attribute in one statement to ensure proper scope-based cleanup
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aPiG_F5EBQUjZqsl@stanley.mountain/
Signed-off-by: Ally Heev <allyheev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end was introduced in GCC-14, and we are
getting ready to enable it, globally.
Use the new TRAILING_OVERLAP() helper to fix the following warning:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:20:34: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
This helper creates a union between a flexible-array member (FAM) and a
set of MEMBERS that would otherwise follow it.
This overlays the trailing MEMBER unsigned char data[10]; onto the FAM
struct asymmetric_key_id::data[], while keeping the FAM and the start
of MEMBER aligned.
The static_assert() ensures this alignment remains, and it's
intentionally placed inmediately after the corresponding structures --no
blank line in between.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows
when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id
structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a
possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious
X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1
INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc.
Fixes: 7901c1a8ef ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling")
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Drivers:
- Add ciphertext hiding support to ccp.
- Add hashjoin, gather and UDMA data move features to hisilicon.
- Add lz4 and lz77_only to hisilicon.
- Add xilinx hwrng driver.
- Add ti driver with ecb/cbc aes support.
- Add ring buffer idle and command queue telemetry for GEN6 in qat.
Others:
- Use rcu_dereference_all to stop false alarms in rhashtable.
- Fix CPU number wraparound in padata.
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Merge tag 'v6.18-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Drivers:
- Add ciphertext hiding support to ccp
- Add hashjoin, gather and UDMA data move features to hisilicon
- Add lz4 and lz77_only to hisilicon
- Add xilinx hwrng driver
- Add ti driver with ecb/cbc aes support
- Add ring buffer idle and command queue telemetry for GEN6 in qat
Others:
- Use rcu_dereference_all to stop false alarms in rhashtable
- Fix CPU number wraparound in padata"
* tag 'v6.18-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (78 commits)
dt-bindings: rng: hisi-rng: convert to DT schema
crypto: doc - Add explicit title heading to API docs
hwrng: ks-sa - fix division by zero in ks_sa_rng_init
KEYS: X.509: Fix Basic Constraints CA flag parsing
crypto: anubis - simplify return statement in anubis_mod_init
crypto: hisilicon/qm - set NULL to qm->debug.qm_diff_regs
crypto: hisilicon/qm - clear all VF configurations in the hardware
crypto: hisilicon - enable error reporting again
crypto: hisilicon/qm - mask axi error before memory init
crypto: hisilicon/qm - invalidate queues in use
crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources
crypto: aspeed - Fix dma_unmap_sg() direction
rhashtable: Use rcu_dereference_all and rcu_dereference_all_check
crypto: comp - Use same definition of context alloc and free ops
crypto: omap - convert from tasklet to BH workqueue
crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user()
crypto: caam - double the entropy delay interval for retry
padata: WQ_PERCPU added to alloc_workqueue users
padata: replace use of system_unbound_wq with system_dfl_wq
crypto: cryptd - WQ_PERCPU added to alloc_workqueue users
...
Fix the X.509 Basic Constraints CA flag parsing to correctly handle
the ASN.1 DER encoded structure. The parser was incorrectly treating
the length field as the boolean value.
Per RFC 5280 section 4.1, X.509 certificates must use ASN.1 DER encoding.
According to ITU-T X.690, a DER-encoded BOOLEAN is represented as:
Tag (0x01), Length (0x01), Value (0x00 for FALSE, 0xFF for TRUE)
The basicConstraints extension with CA:TRUE is encoded as:
SEQUENCE (0x30) | Length | BOOLEAN (0x01) | Length (0x01) | Value (0xFF)
^-- v[2] ^-- v[3] ^-- v[4]
The parser was checking v[3] (the length field, always 0x01) instead
of v[4] (the actual boolean value, 0xFF for TRUE in DER encoding).
Also handle the case where the extension is an empty SEQUENCE (30 00),
which is valid for CA:FALSE when the default value is omitted as
required by DER encoding rules (X.690 section 11.5).
Per ITU-T X.690-0207:
- Section 11.5: Default values must be omitted in DER
- Section 11.1: DER requires TRUE to be encoded as 0xFF
Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280
Link: https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
Fixes: 30eae2b037 ("KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA")
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch extends the BPF_PROG_LOAD command by adding three new fields
to `union bpf_attr` in the user-space API:
- signature: A pointer to the signature blob.
- signature_size: The size of the signature blob.
- keyring_id: The serial number of a loaded kernel keyring (e.g.,
the user or session keyring) containing the trusted public keys.
When a BPF program is loaded with a signature, the kernel:
1. Retrieves the trusted keyring using the provided `keyring_id`.
2. Verifies the supplied signature against the BPF program's
instruction buffer.
3. If the signature is valid and was generated by a key in the trusted
keyring, the program load proceeds.
4. If no signature is provided, the load proceeds as before, allowing
for backward compatibility. LSMs can chose to restrict unsigned
programs and implement a security policy.
5. If signature verification fails for any reason,
the program is not loaded.
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250921160120.9711-2-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
- Add support for emitting a .sbat section into the EFI zboot image, so
that downstreams can easily include revocation metadata in the signed
EFI images
- Align PE symbolic constant names with other projects
- Bug fix for the efi_test module
- Log the physical address and size of the EFI memory map when failing
to map it
- A kerneldoc fix for the EFI stub code
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Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
"Not a lot going on in the EFI tree this cycle. The only thing that
stands out is the new support for SBAT metadata, which was a bit
contentious when it was first proposed, because in the initial
incarnation, it would have required us to maintain a revocation index,
and bump it each time a vulnerability affecting UEFI secure boot got
fixed. This was shot down for obvious reasons.
This time, only the changes needed to emit the SBAT section into the
PE/COFF image are being carried upstream, and it is up to the distros
to decide what to put in there when creating and signing the build.
This only has the EFI zboot bits (which the distros will be using for
arm64); the x86 bzImage changes should be arriving next cycle,
presumably via the -tip tree.
Summary:
- Add support for emitting a .sbat section into the EFI zboot image,
so that downstreams can easily include revocation metadata in the
signed EFI images
- Align PE symbolic constant names with other projects
- Bug fix for the efi_test module
- Log the physical address and size of the EFI memory map when
failing to map it
- A kerneldoc fix for the EFI stub code"
* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
include: pe.h: Fix PE definitions
efi/efi_test: Fix missing pending status update in getwakeuptime
efi: zboot specific mechanism for embedding SBAT section
efi/libstub: Describe missing 'out' parameter in efi_load_initrd
efi: Improve logging around memmap init
The recent code changes in this function triggered a false-positive
maybe-uninitialized warning in software_key_query. Rearrange the
code by moving the sig/tfm variables into the if clause where they
are actually used.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When user space issues a KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system call for a NIST P521
key, the key_size is incorrectly reported as 528 bits instead of 521.
That's because the key size obtained through crypto_sig_keysize() is in
bytes and software_key_query() multiplies by 8 to yield the size in bits.
The underlying assumption is that the key size is always a multiple of 8.
With the recent addition of NIST P521, that's no longer the case.
Fix by returning the key_size in bits from crypto_sig_keysize() and
adjusting the calculations in software_key_query().
The ->key_size() callbacks of sig_alg algorithms now return the size in
bits, whereas the ->digest_size() and ->max_size() callbacks return the
size in bytes. This matches with the units in struct keyctl_pkey_query.
Fixes: a7d45ba77d ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P521 and extend test suite")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system calls for ecdsa keys return the key size as
max_enc_size and max_dec_size, even though such keys cannot be used for
encryption/decryption. They're exclusively for signature generation or
verification.
Only rsa keys with pkcs1 encoding can also be used for encryption or
decryption.
Return 0 instead for ecdsa keys (as well as ecrdsa keys).
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use kzalloc() to zero out the one-element array instead of using
kmalloc() followed by a manual NUL-termination.
No functional changes intended.
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The callers of crypto_sig_sign() assume that the signature size is
always equivalent to the key size.
This happens to be true for RSA, which is currently the only algorithm
implementing the ->sign() callback. But it is false e.g. for X9.62
encoded ECDSA signatures because they have variable length.
Prepare for addition of a ->sign() callback to such algorithms by
letting the callback return the signature size (or a negative integer
on error). When testing the ->sign() callback in test_sig_one(),
use crypto_sig_maxsize() instead of crypto_sig_keysize() to verify that
the test vector's signature does not exceed an algorithm's maximum
signature size.
There has been a relatively recent effort to upstream ECDSA signature
generation support which may benefit from this change:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20220908200036.2034-1-ignat@cloudflare.com/
However the main motivation for this commit is to reduce the number of
crypto_sig_keysize() callers: This function is about to be changed to
return the size in bits instead of bytes and that will require amending
most callers to divide the return value by 8.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
key_being_used_for[] is an unused array of textual names for
the elements of the enum key_being_used_for. It was added in 2015 by
commit 99db443506 ("PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated
attributes and content type")
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Commit 1e562deace ("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend")
enforced that rsassa-pkcs1 sign/verify operations specify a hash
algorithm. That is necessary because per RFC 8017 sec 8.2, a hash
algorithm identifier must be prepended to the hash before generating or
verifying the signature ("Full Hash Prefix").
However the commit went too far in that it changed user space behavior:
KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY system calls now return -EINVAL unless they specify a
hash algorithm. Intel Wireless Daemon (iwd) is one application issuing
such system calls (for EAP-TLS).
Closer analysis of the Embedded Linux Library (ell) used by iwd reveals
that the problem runs even deeper: When iwd uses TLS 1.1 or earlier, it
not only queries for keys, but performs sign/verify operations without
specifying a hash algorithm. These legacy TLS versions concatenate an
MD5 to a SHA-1 hash and omit the Full Hash Prefix:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/tree/ell/tls-suites.c#n97
TLS 1.1 was deprecated in 2021 by RFC 8996, but removal of support was
inadvertent in this case. It probably should be coordinated with iwd
maintainers first.
So reinstate support for such legacy protocols by defaulting to hash
algorithm "none" which uses an empty Full Hash Prefix.
If it is later on decided to remove TLS 1.1 support but still allow
KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY without a hash algorithm, that can be achieved by
reverting the present commit and replacing it with the following patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZxalYZwH5UiGX5uj@wunner.de/
It's worth noting that Python's cryptography library gained support for
such legacy use cases very recently, so they do seem to still be a thing.
The Python developers identified IKE version 1 as another protocol
omitting the Full Hash Prefix:
https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/10226https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/5495
The author of those issues, Zoltan Kelemen, spent considerable effort
searching for test vectors but only found one in a 2019 blog post by
Kevin Jones. Add it to testmgr.h to verify correctness of this feature.
Examination of wpa_supplicant as well as various IKE daemons (libreswan,
strongswan, isakmpd, raccoon) has determined that none of them seems to
use the kernel's Key Retention Service, so iwd is the only affected user
space application known so far.
Fixes: 1e562deace ("crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend")
Reported-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ed09a22-86c0-4cf0-8bda-ef804ccb3413@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
encrypt_blob(), decrypt_blob() and create_signature() were some of the
functions added in 2018 by
commit 5a30771832 ("KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new
key type ops [ver #2]")
however, they've not been used.
Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Alternatively to the X9.62 encoding of ecdsa signatures, which uses
ASN.1 and is already supported by the kernel, there's another common
encoding called P1363. It stores r and s as the concatenation of two
big endian, unsigned integers. The name originates from IEEE P1363.
Add a P1363 template in support of the forthcoming SPDM library
(Security Protocol and Data Model) for PCI device authentication.
P1363 is prescribed by SPDM 1.2.1 margin no 44:
"For ECDSA signatures, excluding SM2, in SPDM, the signature shall be
the concatenation of r and s. The size of r shall be the size of
the selected curve. Likewise, the size of s shall be the size of
the selected curve. See BaseAsymAlgo in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS for
the size of r and s. The byte order for r and s shall be in big
endian order. When placing ECDSA signatures into an SPDM signature
field, r shall come first followed by s."
Link: https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0274_1.2.1.pdf
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
software_key_query() returns the maximum signature and digest size for a
given key to user space. When it only supported RSA keys, calculating
those sizes was trivial as they were always equivalent to the key size.
However when ECDSA was added, the function grew somewhat complicated
calculations which take the ASN.1 encoding and curve into account.
This doesn't scale well and adjusting the calculations is easily
forgotten when adding support for new encodings or curves. In fact,
when NIST P521 support was recently added, the function was initially
not amended:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/b749d5ee-c3b8-4cbd-b252-7773e4536e07@linux.ibm.com/
Introduce a ->max_size() callback to struct sig_alg and take advantage
of it to move the signature size calculations to ecdsa-x962.c.
Introduce a ->digest_size() callback to struct sig_alg and move the
maximum ECDSA digest size to ecdsa.c. It is common across ecdsa-x962.c
and the upcoming ecdsa-p1363.c and thus inherited by both of them.
For all other algorithms, continue using the key size as maximum
signature and digest size.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
crypto_sig_maxsize() is a bit of a misnomer as it doesn't return the
maximum signature size, but rather the key size.
Rename it as well as all implementations of the ->max_size callback.
A subsequent commit introduces a crypto_sig_maxsize() function which
returns the actual maximum signature size.
While at it, change the return type of crypto_sig_keysize() from int to
unsigned int for consistency with crypto_akcipher_maxsize(). None of
the callers checks for a negative return value and an error condition
can always be indicated by returning zero.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Unlike the rsa driver, which separates signature decoding and
signature verification into two steps, the ecdsa driver does both in one.
This restricts users to the one signature format currently supported
(X9.62) and prevents addition of others such as P1363, which is needed
by the forthcoming SPDM library (Security Protocol and Data Model) for
PCI device authentication.
Per Herbert's suggestion, change ecdsa to use a "raw" signature encoding
and then implement X9.62 and P1363 as templates which convert their
respective encodings to the raw one. One may then specify
"x962(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" or "p1363(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" to pick the encoding.
The present commit moves X9.62 decoding to a template. A separate
commit is going to introduce another template for P1363 decoding.
The ecdsa driver internally represents a signature as two u64 arrays of
size ECC_MAX_BYTES. This appears to be the most natural choice for the
raw format as it can directly be used for verification without having to
further decode signature data or copy it around.
Repurpose all the existing test vectors for "x962(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" and
create a duplicate of them to test the raw encoding.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZoHXyGwRzVvYkcTP@gondor.apana.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
A sig_alg backend has just been introduced with the intent of moving all
asymmetric sign/verify algorithms to it one by one.
Migrate the sign/verify operations from rsa-pkcs1pad.c to a separate
rsassa-pkcs1.c which uses the new backend.
Consequently there are now two templates which build on the "rsa"
akcipher_alg:
* The existing "pkcs1pad" template, which is instantiated as an
akcipher_instance and retains the encrypt/decrypt operations of
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 7.2).
* The new "pkcs1" template, which is instantiated as a sig_instance
and contains the sign/verify operations of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
(RFC 8017 sec 8.2).
In a separate step, rsa-pkcs1pad.c could optionally be renamed to
rsaes-pkcs1.c for clarity. Additional "oaep" and "pss" templates
could be added for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS.
Note that it's currently allowed to allocate a "pkcs1pad(rsa)" transform
without specifying a hash algorithm. That makes sense if the transform
is only used for encrypt/decrypt and continues to be supported. But for
sign/verify, such transforms previously did not insert the Full Hash
Prefix into the padding. The resulting message encoding was incompliant
with EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 9.2) and therefore nonsensical.
From here on in, it is no longer allowed to allocate a transform without
specifying a hash algorithm if the transform is used for sign/verify
operations. This simplifies the code because the insertion of the Full
Hash Prefix is no longer optional, so various "if (digest_info)" clauses
can be removed.
There has been a previous attempt to forbid transform allocation without
specifying a hash algorithm, namely by commit c0d20d22e0 ("crypto:
rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present"). It had to be rolled back
with commit b3a8c8a5eb ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be
optional [ver #2]"), presumably because it broke allocation of a
transform which was solely used for encrypt/decrypt, not sign/verify.
Avoid such breakage by allowing transform allocation for encrypt/decrypt
with and without specifying a hash algorithm (and simply ignoring the
hash algorithm in the former case).
So again, specifying a hash algorithm is now mandatory for sign/verify,
but optional and ignored for encrypt/decrypt.
The new sig_alg API uses kernel buffers instead of sglists, which
avoids the overhead of copying signature and digest from sglists back
into kernel buffers. rsassa-pkcs1.c is thus simplified quite a bit.
sig_alg is always synchronous, whereas the underlying "rsa" akcipher_alg
may be asynchronous. So await the result of the akcipher_alg, similar
to crypto_akcipher_sync_{en,de}crypt().
As part of the migration, rename "rsa_digest_info" to "hash_prefix" to
adhere to the spec language in RFC 9580. Otherwise keep the code
unmodified wherever possible to ease reviewing and bisecting. Leave
several simplification and hardening opportunities to separate commits.
rsassa-pkcs1.c uses modern __free() syntax for allocation of buffers
which need to be freed by kfree_sensitive(), hence a DEFINE_FREE()
clause for kfree_sensitive() is introduced herein as a byproduct.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2}
arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops
because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway.
Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch
to avoid duplicate NULL checks.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static
analysis tool.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+
Fixes: 7d30198ee2 ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID")
Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The SM2 algorithm has a single user in the kernel. However, it's
never been integrated properly with that user: asymmetric_keys.
The crux of the issue is that the way it computes its digest with
sm3 does not fit into the architecture of asymmetric_keys. As no
solution has been proposed, remove this algorithm.
It can be resubmitted when it is integrated properly into the
asymmetric_keys subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Adds a self-test testing PCKS#7 signed data against ECDSA key and
couple of bug fixes for missing deps.
BR, Jarkko
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Merge tag 'asymmetric-keys-next-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull asymmetric keys update from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"Add a self-test testing PCKS#7 signed data against ECDSA key and
couple of bug fixes for missing deps"
* tag 'asymmetric-keys-next-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
certs: Add ECDSA signature verification self-test
certs: Move RSA self-test data to separate file
KEYS: asymmetric: Add missing dependencies of FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST
KEYS: asymmetric: Add missing dependency on CRYPTO_SIG
Commit c27b2d2012 ("crypto: testmgr - allow ecdsa-nist-p256 and -p384
in FIPS mode") enabled support for ECDSA in crypto/testmgr.c. The
PKCS#7 signature verification API builds upon the KCAPI primitives to
perform its high-level operations. Therefore, this change in testmgr.c
also allows ECDSA to be used by the PKCS#7 signature verification API
(in FIPS mode).
However, from a FIPS perspective, the PKCS#7 signature verification API
is a distinct "service" from the KCAPI primitives. This is because the
PKCS#7 API performs a "full" signature verification, which consists of
both hashing the data to be verified, and the public key operation.
On the other hand, the KCAPI primitive does not perform this hashing
step - it accepts pre-hashed data from the caller and only performs the
public key operation.
For this reason, the ECDSA self-tests in crypto/testmgr.c are not
sufficient to cover ECDSA signature verification offered by the PKCS#7
API. This is reflected by the self-test already present in this file
for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification.
The solution is simply to add a second self-test here for ECDSA. P-256
with SHA-256 hashing was chosen as those parameters should remain
FIPS-approved for the foreseeable future, while keeping the performance
impact to a minimum. The ECDSA certificate and PKCS#7 signed data was
generated using OpenSSL. The input data is identical to the input data
for the existing RSA self-test.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
In preparation of adding new ECDSA self-tests, the existing data for
the RSA self-tests is moved to a separate file. This file is only
compiled if the new CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST_RSA configuration
option is set, which ensures that the required dependencies (RSA,
SHA-256) are present. Otherwise, the kernel would panic when trying to
execute the self-test.
The introduction of this new option, rather than adding the
dependencies to the existing CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST option,
allows for additional self-tests to be added for different algorithms.
The kernel can then be configured to only execute the self-tests for
those algorithms that are included.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
API:
- Remove crypto stats interface.
Algorithms:
- Add faster AES-XTS on modern x86_64 CPUs.
- Forbid curves with order less than 224 bits in ecc (FIPS 186-5).
- Add ECDSA NIST P521.
Drivers:
- Expose otp zone in atmel.
- Add dh fallback for primes > 4K in qat.
- Add interface for live migration in qat.
- Use dma for aes requests in starfive.
- Add full DMA support for stm32mpx in stm32.
- Add Tegra Security Engine driver.
Others:
- Introduce scope-based x509_certificate allocation.
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Merge tag 'v6.10-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Remove crypto stats interface
Algorithms:
- Add faster AES-XTS on modern x86_64 CPUs
- Forbid curves with order less than 224 bits in ecc (FIPS 186-5)
- Add ECDSA NIST P521
Drivers:
- Expose otp zone in atmel
- Add dh fallback for primes > 4K in qat
- Add interface for live migration in qat
- Use dma for aes requests in starfive
- Add full DMA support for stm32mpx in stm32
- Add Tegra Security Engine driver
Others:
- Introduce scope-based x509_certificate allocation"
* tag 'v6.10-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (123 commits)
crypto: atmel-sha204a - provide the otp content
crypto: atmel-sha204a - add reading from otp zone
crypto: atmel-i2c - rename read function
crypto: atmel-i2c - add missing arg description
crypto: iaa - Use kmemdup() instead of kzalloc() and memcpy()
crypto: sahara - use 'time_left' variable with wait_for_completion_timeout()
crypto: api - use 'time_left' variable with wait_for_completion_killable_timeout()
crypto: caam - i.MX8ULP donot have CAAM page0 access
crypto: caam - init-clk based on caam-page0-access
crypto: starfive - Use fallback for unaligned dma access
crypto: starfive - Do not free stack buffer
crypto: starfive - Skip unneeded fallback allocation
crypto: starfive - Skip dma setup for zeroed message
crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - fix for register offset
crypto: hisilicon/debugfs - mask the unnecessary info from the dump
crypto: qat - specify firmware files for 402xx
crypto: x86/aes-gcm - simplify GCM hash subkey derivation
crypto: x86/aes-gcm - delete unused GCM assembly code
crypto: x86/aes-xts - simplify loop in xts_crypt_slowpath()
hwrng: stm32 - repair clock handling
...
Since the signature self-test uses RSA and SHA-256, it must only be
enabled when those algorithms are enabled. Otherwise it fails and
panics the kernel on boot-up.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404221528.51d75177-lkp@intel.com
Fixes: 3cde3174eb ("certs: Add FIPS selftests")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Make ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE select CRYPTO_SIG to avoid build
errors like the following, which were possible with
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y && CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIG=n:
ld: vmlinux.o: in function `public_key_verify_signature':
(.text+0x306280): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_sig'
ld: (.text+0x306300): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_pubkey'
ld: (.text+0x306324): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_verify'
ld: (.text+0x30636c): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_privkey'
Fixes: 63ba4d6759 ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add a DEFINE_FREE() clause for x509_certificate structs and use it in
x509_cert_parse() and x509_key_preparse(). These are the only functions
where scope-based x509_certificate allocation currently makes sense.
A third user will be introduced with the forthcoming SPDM library
(Security Protocol and Data Model) for PCI device authentication.
Unlike most other DEFINE_FREE() clauses, this one checks for IS_ERR()
instead of NULL before calling x509_free_certificate() at end of scope.
That's because the "constructor" of x509_certificate structs,
x509_cert_parse(), returns a valid pointer or an ERR_PTR(), but never
NULL.
Comparing the Assembler output before/after has shown they are identical,
save for the fact that gcc-12 always generates two return paths when
__cleanup() is used, one for the success case and one for the error case.
In x509_cert_parse(), add a hint for the compiler that kzalloc() never
returns an ERR_PTR(). Otherwise the compiler adds a gratuitous IS_ERR()
check on return. Introduce an assume() macro for this which can be
re-used elsewhere in the kernel to provide hints for the compiler.
Suggested-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231003153937.000034ca@Huawei.com/
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/934679/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Enable the x509 parser to accept NIST P521 certificates and add the
OID for ansip521r1, which is the identifier for NIST P521.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Adjust the calculation of the maximum signature size for support of
NIST P521. While existing curves may prepend a 0 byte to their coordinates
(to make the number positive), NIST P521 will not do this since only the
first bit in the most significant byte is used.
If the encoding of the x & y coordinates requires at least 128 bytes then
an additional byte is needed for the encoding of the length. Take this into
account when calculating the maximum signature size.
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This reverts commit 16ab7cb582 because it
broke iwd. iwd uses the KEYCTL_PKEY_* UAPIs via its dependency libell,
and apparently it is relying on SHA-1 signature support. These UAPIs
are fairly obscure, and their documentation does not mention which
algorithms they support. iwd really should be using a properly
supported userspace crypto library instead. Regardless, since something
broke we have to revert the change.
It may be possible that some parts of this commit can be reinstated
without breaking iwd (e.g. probably the removal of MODULE_SIG_SHA1), but
for now this just does a full revert to get things working again.
Reported-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CZSHRUIJ4RKL.34T4EASV5DNJM@matfyz.cz
Cc: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The pointer secs is being assigned a value however secs is never
read afterwards. The pointer secs is redundant and can be removed.
Cleans up clang scan build warning:
warning: Although the value stored to 'secs' is used in the enclosing
expression, the value is never actually read from 'secs'
[deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
API:
- Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface.
- Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls.
- Remove ahash alignmask attribute.
Algorithms:
- Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc.
- Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1).
- Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad.
- Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum.
- Remove zlib-deflate.
Drivers:
- Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver.
- Add STM32MP13x support in stm32.
- Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng.
- Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip.
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Merge tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface
- Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls
- Remove ahash alignmask attribute
Algorithms:
- Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc
- Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1)
- Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad
- Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum
- Remove zlib-deflate
Drivers:
- Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver
- Add STM32MP13x support in stm32
- Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng
- Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip"
* tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (283 commits)
crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmapping
crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct place
Documentation/module-signing.txt: bring up to date
module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3
crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support
crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMA
x509: Add OIDs for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash and signatures
crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash
crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash type
crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.c
crypto: talitos - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: chelsio - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: ahash - improve file comment
crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_priv
crypto: ahash - remove crypto_ahash_alignmask
crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahash
net: ipv6: stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask
...
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Four integrity changes: two IMA-overlay updates, an integrity Kconfig
cleanup, and a secondary keyring update"
* tag 'integrity-v6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file
certs: Only allow certs signed by keys on the builtin keyring
integrity: fix indentation of config attributes
ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings
Originally the secondary trusted keyring provided a keyring to which extra
keys may be added, provided those keys were not blacklisted and were
vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already in the secondary
trusted keyring.
On systems with the machine keyring configured, additional keys may also
be vouched for by a key on the machine keyring.
Prevent loading additional certificates directly onto the secondary
keyring, vouched for by keys on the machine keyring, yet allow these
certificates to be loaded onto other trusted keyrings.
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash signature support in x509 certificates, pkcs7
signatures, and authenticode signatures. Supports hashes of size 256
and up, as 224 is too weak for any practical purposes.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Per section 4.c. of the IETF Trust Legal Provisions, "Code Components"
in IETF Documents are licensed on the terms of the BSD-3-Clause license:
https://trustee.ietf.org/documents/trust-legal-provisions/tlp-5/
The term "Code Components" specifically includes ASN.1 modules:
https://trustee.ietf.org/documents/trust-legal-provisions/code-components-list-3/
Add an SPDX identifier as well as a copyright notice pursuant to section
6.d. of the Trust Legal Provisions to all ASN.1 modules in the tree
which are derived from IETF Documents.
Section 4.d. of the Trust Legal Provisions requests that each Code
Component identify the RFC from which it is taken, so link that RFC
in every ASN.1 module.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The modular build fails because the self-test code depends on pkcs7
which in turn depends on x509 which contains the self-test.
Split the self-test out into its own module to break the cycle.
Fixes: 3cde3174eb ("certs: Add FIPS selftests")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It is possible to stand up own certificates and sign PE-COFF binaries
using SHA-224. However it never became popular or needed since it has
similar costs as SHA-256. Windows Authenticode infrastructure never
had support for SHA-224, and all secureboot keys used fro linux
vmlinuz have always been using at least SHA-256.
Given the point of mscode_parser is to support interoperatiblity with
typical de-facto hashes, remove support for SHA-224 to avoid
posibility of creating interoperatibility issues with rhboot/shim,
grub, and non-linux systems trying to sign or verify vmlinux.
SHA-224 itself is not removed from the kernel, as it is truncated
SHA-256. If requested I can write patches to remove SHA-224 support
across all of the drivers.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Removes support for sha1 signed kernel modules, importing sha1 signed
x.509 certificates.
rsa-pkcs1pad keeps sha1 padding support, which seems to be used by
virtio driver.
sha1 remains available as there are many drivers and subsystems using
it. Note only hmac(sha1) with secret keys remains cryptographically
secure.
In the kernel there are filesystems, IMA, tpm/pcr that appear to be
using sha1. Maybe they can all start to be slowly upgraded to
something else i.e. blake3, ParallelHash, SHAKE256 as needed.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The new sign/verify code broke the case of pkcs1pad without a
hash algorithm. Fix it by setting issig correctly for this case.
Fixes: 63ba4d6759 ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5
Reported-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove support for md4 md5 hash and signatures in x.509 certificate
parsers, pkcs7 signature parser, authenticode parser.
All of these are insecure or broken, and everyone has long time ago
migrated to alternative hash implementations.
Also remove md2 & md3 oids which have already didn't have support.
This is also likely the last user of md4 in the kernel, and thus
crypto/md4.c and related tests in tcrypt & testmgr can likely be
removed. Other users such as cifs smbfs ext modpost sumversions have
their own internal implementation as needed.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The ASN.1 module in RFC 5280 appendix A.1 uses EXPLICIT TAGS whereas the
one in appendix A.2 uses IMPLICIT TAGS.
The kernel's simplified asn1_compiler.c always uses EXPLICIT TAGS, hence
definitions from appendix A.2 need to be annotated as IMPLICIT for the
compiler to generate RFC-compliant code.
In particular, GeneralName is defined in appendix A.2:
GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
otherName [0] OtherName,
...
dNSName [2] IA5String,
x400Address [3] ORAddress,
directoryName [4] Name,
...
}
Because appendix A.2 uses IMPLICIT TAGS, the IA5String tag (0x16) of a
dNSName is not rendered. Instead, the string directly succeeds the
[2] tag (0x82).
Likewise, the SEQUENCE tag (0x30) of an OtherName is not rendered.
Instead, only the constituents of the SEQUENCE are rendered: An OID tag
(0x06), a [0] tag (0xa0) and an ANY tag. That's three consecutive tags
instead of a single encompassing tag.
The situation is different for x400Address and directoryName choices:
They reference ORAddress and Name, which are defined in appendix A.1,
therefore use EXPLICIT TAGS.
The AKID ASN.1 module is missing several IMPLICIT annotations, hence
isn't RFC-compliant. In the unlikely event that an AKID contains other
elements beside a directoryName, users may see parse errors.
Add the missing annotations but do not tag this commit for stable as I
am not aware of any issue reports. Fixes are only eligible for stable
if they're "obviously correct" and with ASN.1 there's no such thing.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
API:
- Move crypto engine callback from tfm ctx into algorithm object.
- Fix atomic sleep bug in crypto_destroy_instance.
- Move lib/mpi into lib/crypto.
Algorithms:
- Add chacha20 and poly1305 implementation for powerpc p10.
Drivers:
- Add AES skcipher and aead support to starfive.
- Add Dynamic Boost Control support to ccp.
- Add support for STM32P13 platform to stm32.
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Merge tag 'v6.6-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Move crypto engine callback from tfm ctx into algorithm object
- Fix atomic sleep bug in crypto_destroy_instance
- Move lib/mpi into lib/crypto
Algorithms:
- Add chacha20 and poly1305 implementation for powerpc p10
Drivers:
- Add AES skcipher and aead support to starfive
- Add Dynamic Boost Control support to ccp
- Add support for STM32P13 platform to stm32"
* tag 'v6.6-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (149 commits)
Revert "dt-bindings: crypto: qcom,prng: Add SM8450"
crypto: chelsio - Remove unused declarations
X.509: if signature is unsupported skip validation
crypto: qat - fix crypto capability detection for 4xxx
crypto: drivers - Explicitly include correct DT includes
crypto: engine - Remove crypto_engine_ctx
crypto: zynqmp - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: virtio - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: stm32 - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: jh7110 - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: rk3288 - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: omap - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: keembay - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: sl3516 - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: caam - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: aspeed - Remove non-standard sha512 algorithms
crypto: aspeed - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: amlogic - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: sun8i-ss - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
crypto: sun8i-ce - Use new crypto_engine_op interface
...
When the hash algorithm for the signature is not available the digest size
is 0 and the signature in the certificate is marked as unsupported.
When validating a self-signed certificate, this needs to be checked,
because otherwise trying to validate the signature will fail with an
warning:
Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:537 \
pkcs1pad_verify+0x46/0x12c
...
Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-22)
Signed-off-by: Thore Sommer <public@thson.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4a ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
based on the key having digitalSignature usage set. Additionally, verify
the new certificate against the ones in the system keyrings. Add two
additional functions to use the new restriction within either the builtin
or secondary keyrings.
[jarkko@kernel.org: Fix checkpatch.pl --strict issues]
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
key might contain private part of the key, so better use
kfree_sensitive to free it
Signed-off-by: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix kernel-doc warnings in verify_pefile:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:423: warning: Excess function
parameter 'trust_keys' description in 'verify_pefile_signature'
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:423: warning: Function parameter
or member 'trusted_keys' not described in 'verify_pefile_signature'
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Ally Heev