89fe91c659
As a part of MANA hardening for CVM, add validation for the doorbell
ID (db_id) received from hardware in the GDMA_REGISTER_DEVICE response
to prevent out-of-bounds memory access when calculating the doorbell
page address.
In mana_gd_ring_doorbell(), the doorbell page address is calculated as:
addr = db_page_base + db_page_size * db_index
= (bar0_va + db_page_off) + db_page_size * db_index
A hardware could return values that cause this address to fall outside
the BAR0 MMIO region. In Confidential VM environments, hardware responses
cannot be fully trusted.
Add the following validations:
- Store the BAR0 size (bar0_size) in gdma_context during probe.
- Validate the doorbell page offset (db_page_off) read from device
registers does not exceed bar0_size during initialization, converting
mana_gd_init_registers() to return an error code.
- Validate db_id from GDMA_REGISTER_DEVICE response against the
maximum number of doorbell pages that fit within BAR0.
Signed-off-by: Erni Sri Satya Vennela <ernis@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260306211212.543376-1-ernis@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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| acpi | ||
| asm-generic | ||
| clocksource | ||
| crypto | ||
| cxl | ||
| drm | ||
| dt-bindings | ||
| hyperv | ||
| keys | ||
| kunit | ||
| kvm | ||
| linux | ||
| math-emu | ||
| media | ||
| memory | ||
| misc | ||
| net | ||
| pcmcia | ||
| ras | ||
| rdma | ||
| rv | ||
| scsi | ||
| soc | ||
| sound | ||
| target | ||
| trace | ||
| uapi | ||
| ufs | ||
| vdso | ||
| video | ||
| xen | ||
| Kbuild | ||